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The elements of Modern Sea Power are as diffuse diverse
and comnlicated as tv^e body of man. Sea Power embraces most of
tbe scientific kno^ledpe available. Its shins and the supDorting
arm of t)"e s: ore establl shmen+ enlists the service of men and
women of almost every class, race, and creed. It has an almost
insatiable appetite for the nroducts of the factory, farm, forest,
mine, and the mountain. The sea is its common denominator to
which men and materiel are drawn, shaped and welded into a fight-
ing organization capable of delivering crippling and disastrous
blows to a potential enemy.
These elements of Sea Power are fighting ships, merchant
ships, bases both rear and advanced, and as the last war so aptly
brought forth, air power. These four elements of Sea Power when
broken down mean: a seacoast from which the ships and planes can
operate; it means fiphting vessels from the largest aircraft
carrier to the smallest of flphting vessels the PT boats; it
means aii.xlllary vessels such as -transports, hospital ships, suDply
ships, and tankers; It means 'he following: men and women to man
the shiDS and ^o carry out the administrative work, the airfields,
the wharves, the docks, the machine shops, and the skilled labor,
planes of all types; the Dilots and trained crews to fly the planes
training schools for both officers and men; and finally, the vast
network of industrial plants, steel mills, ordnance plants, plane




of the elements which must be considered when one thinks of Sea




A Navy, or for that matter, any of the branches of the
Armed forces, Is an expensive and, unfortunately a nomDroductive
institution. It is not like a shipping concern which operates for
a financial profit. Fighting ships do not earn their way but
literally devour funds and materiel and as a result become a drain
on the national economy. Their existence, however, can be com-
pared to a form of insurance in that when they are needed, they
can perform the function for which they were conceived. In
general these functions are threefold; aggressive conquest,
defensive protection, the protection of trade.
In this day when imperalistic expansion by the so-called
Democratic countries has come to a halt, the Armed Forces can be
regarded as a shield of defense and a powerful stabilizing factor
in the game of power politics. We do not covet any foreign soil
nor do we have any deslr^ (for there is no compelling reason) for
overseas exnanslon. Oir foreign ^rade although important to our
system of free enterprise, and one which should be guarded, is not
completely indespensible to the nation.




foreign trade, nor is it the result of expansionist desires. The
Navy's role is that of America's first line of defense; its ships
and planes are the ramparts of the Western Hemisphere.
Sea Defense denotes mobility, A Navy to endure must not be
one which is leashed to its own bases or one which cannot take the
fight to the enemy. To dominate the sea it is mandatory that the
Navy must ejtercise control of the sea in three dimensions - above,
on and below the sea. And yet, although this paper is a report on
the U. S. Navy never sho-ild the reader forf^et that the other
services - Army, Air Force, and Marine - each of these make up the
comDonent parts of a vpell integrated fighting team.
As statements of nolicy are quite annarent in the business
world and are promulgated to all subordinates for their guidance
so is a statement of policy promulgated for the guidance of the
Armed Forces. Congress, in the National Security Act of 194-7,
has described the basic policy embodied in the Act in the follow-
ing terms:
"In enacting this legislation, it is the intent of the Congress
to provide a comprehensive program for the future security of
the United States; to provide for the establishment of inte-
grated policies and procedures for the departments, agencies,
and functions of the Government relating to the National
Security; to provide three Military departments for the
operation and administration of the Army, the Navy (including
Naval Aviation and the United States Marine Corps), and the
Air Force, with their assigned combat and service components;
to provide for their authoritative coordination and unified
direction under civilian control but not to merge them; to
provide for the effective strategic direction of the Armed




thelr intepration into an efficient team of land, naval and
air forces." 1
In consonance with our traditional governmental system of
checks and balances, the foregoinf conceot expressed in the
National Security Act tended to obviate a potential growth of the
military as a force which may weild great influence in both
national and international affairs. The key phrase " to provide
for their authoritative coordination and unified direction under
civilian control " formally established an organization wherein no
function of the Military and, in this instance, the U, S. Navy or
any of its component agencies could be performed independent of
the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense.
On April 30,1953 the President's message to Congress set forth
the following object to be kept constantly in mind in connection
with OUT organization for defense,
0\ir Military Establishment must be founded nnon our basic
constitutional nrlnc^'nies and traditions. There must be a
clear and unchallenged cl^'ilian responsibility in the Defense
Establishment. TMs is essential not only to maintain demo-
cratic institutions, but also to nrotect the integrity of the
military nrofession. Basic decisions relating to the military
forces must be made by Dolitically accountable civilian
officials. Conversely, orofessional military leaders must not
be thrust into the political arena to become the prey of
partisan politics. To guard these principles, we must recog-
nize and respect the clear lines of responsibility and
authority which run from the President, through the Secretary
of Defense and the Secretaries of the military departments, I
^
over the operations of all branches of the Department of Defense.*^
^Department of Defense Directive Number 5100,1, Functions
of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff , dated
March 16.1954-.
^ Department of Defense Directive Number 5158.1,Method of
Operation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Their Relationships with




The National Security Act, furthermore, established the
three services of the Army, Navy and Air Force as integral
members of a fighting team. The policies and procedures of the
departments and agencies of the DeDartment of Defense are to be
given the maximum DractlcaMe integration and correlation in order
to produce an effective, economical, harmonious, and business-like
organization which will insure the military security of the
United States. 11 is interesting to no^e that it is the intent of
Congress that the Military Establishment be run on business-like
basis and that overlapping and unnecessary duplication are to be
avoided. And so it should be when one remembers the tremendous
drain of maintaining even a peace-time military organization on o'Oi'
national economy. The economics of both monetary and resources i
must be forever a thought to be reckoned with. The President
emphasized this in his message to Congress.
Effectiveness with economy must be made the watch-words of our
defense effort. To maintain an adequate national defense for
the indefinite future, we have found it necessary to devote a
larger share of our national resources than any of us have
heretofore anticipated. To protect our economy, maximum
effectiveness at minimum cost is essential.
We must develop the best nossible military plans. These plans
must be so^md guides to action in case of war. They must in-
cornorate the most comnetent and consid-^red thinking from every
Doint of view — military, scientific, industrial, and
economic, 3
It Is obvious that since we derive our basic civil rights





our potential enemies. That rmction has been laid down in the
National Security Act as a common function of the Armed Forces in
that they shall, under the direction of the Secretary of Defense
with the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, support and defend
the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign
and domestic.
To be specific the U, S. Navy in order to carry out its
share of this responsibility has established a Naval policy.
It is naval policy to maintain the Department of the Navy as a
thoroughly integrated entity with sufficient strength on the
sea and in the air to uphold, in conjunction with our other
Armed Forces, our national policies and interests, to support
our commerce and our international obligations, and to guard
the United States ineli-'ding its overseas possessions and
dependencies. The effectuation of this policy imposes upon
the execiitlve administration of the Department of the Navy
four principal tasks:
a. First, to interpret, annly and uphold the national
policies and interests in the development and use of the
Department of the Navy. This task may be described as the
"DOlicy control" of t>e Department of the Navy.
b. Second, to command the Operating Forces, and to maintain
them in a state of readiness to conduct war; and to promul-
gate to the Department of the Navy directives embracing matter:^
of operations, security, intelligence, discipline, naval
communications, and similar matters of naval administration.
This task may be described as the "naval command" of the
Department of the Navy.
c. Third, to coordinate and direct the effort of the Navy
Department and the Shore Establishment in order to assure the
development, procurement, production and distribution of
material, facilities and personnel to the Operating Forces.
This task may be described as the "logistics administration
and control " of the Department of the Navy.
d.Fourthj to develop and maintain efficiency and economy in
the oporation of the Department of the Navy with particular
regard to matters of organization, staffing, administrative
procedures, the utilization of personnel, materials and facil-
ities, and the budgeting and expenditure of funds. This task




Department of the Navy.
Figure 1 depicting the latest organizational structure of
the U. S. Navy shows the Department of the Navy as being admin-
istered by the Secretary of the Navy. He has authority over the
whole department subject to the direction, authority and control
of the Secretary of Defense.
From this figure it can be seen that the whole Department
of the Navy consists of three T)r1nciDal riarts. These are:
a. The Orjeratinp Forces of the Navy. This Dart is obviously
the most Imnortant and for which the other two '^arts are in
existence to serve this one part. It consists of the several fleet^,
seagoing forces, sea frontier forces, district forces. Fleet
Marine Forces and other assigned Marine Forces, the Military Sea
Transportation Service. It may also consist of such shore activ-
ities of the Navy and other forces and activities which may be
assigned to the Operating Forces of the Navy by the President or
the Secretary of the Navy.
b. The Navy Headquarters located in Washington D, C, or where
ever the seat of the Government may be located. It is the central
executive authority of the Department of the Navy and comprises
the various bureaus, boards and offices of the Navy Department and
Headquarters, Marine Corps. When the Coast Guard is operating as
part of the Navy its headquarters will become a member of this
General Order Number 5, Assipnment and Distribution of
Authority and Res->onsiblllty for the Administration of the
















































c. The Shore Establishment, which comprises all activities of
the DeTDartment of the Navy not assigned to the Oijerating Forces
of the Navy and not a pa^t of the Navy Denartment. This includes
those operating forces of the Marine Corps which are not assigned
to the operating forces of the Navy or to a unified or Joint
command.
A further study of the organizational structure of the
Navy reveals three main divisions of the Navy, each headed by a
so-called civilian Executive Assistant or Naval Professional
Assistant, This system tends to further provide for a check on
the power of the military by distributing the business and logistic
administration of the Navy and the Naval and Logistic Command
among many of these assistants. Each are dependent upon one
another for the successful fulfilling of the Naval mission.
Figure 2 depicts this concept graDhically.
The National Security Act brought forth an important
change in the stat^is of t^e Marine Corns. Immediately after World
War II the Marine Corr>s was directly responsible to the Chief of
Naval Operations for its administration. However, the National
Security Act provided that the Commandant be directly responsible
to the Secretary of the Navy for its administration, discipline,
internal organization, unit training, requirements, efficiency and
readiness, and for the total performance of the Marine Corps. The














































































































If World War II or the Korean War has brought to light
any new principles of warfare, it is, undoubtedly, the importance
of coordination. This principle is clearly stated in the National
Security Act and is of such imDortance that I intend to write the
remainder of this paper on it.
Organization has Its heplnninp when two Deople combine
their efforts In order to achieve a given objective. Two men
unite their strength so that they may move a large and heavy
object that is too heavy or bulky to be moved by one person alone.
This combination of effort is not the principle of coordination.
It is only an illustration of organization itself. The efforts of
the two persons must be coordinated in that they must lift the
object together. If one lifts and then the other, there, of
course, would be no unity of action, and hence, no organization of
effort. Coordination is the orderly arrangement of group effort
to provide iinity of action in the pursuit of a common purpose.
Coordination is an all inclusive principle of organization,
Its foundation can be found in the authority of the supreme
coordinating power for in every organization this supreme author-





In whatever form It may a^T^ear, tMs supreme authority
must be conceived as the source of no^er necessary to effect
coordination. To become effective the principles of leadership
and the process of delepation roust be applied throughout the entire
organizational structure. From this a well defined chain of
command is formed with sharply enunciated responsibilities and
precise authorities at each organizational level.
The traditional organization of the Navy afloat embodies
this concept and, although, it is all too taken for granted by
many Naval Officers can be set up as an excellent example of the
relationship of supreme authority and his subordinates. From the
Commander of a Fleet downward, the authority and responsibility of
every person is clearly defined, understood and maintained. An
examination of Shipboard organization will reveal a strict
adherence to the fundamentals of organized group effort. The
concept of the chain of command i s well defined In the Line
Structure.
Line Structure
The formal coordination of the entire structure is effeo«
tuated by the leadership of the line, by authority being projected
through the chain of command. As an organization grows so does
the importance which is placed on leadership. This becomes quite
obvious when a ship joins a division, a division a squadron, a
squadron a task force, a task force a fleet. The quality of lead-
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ership exerted by the Fleet Commander and projected throughout
his command takes on an importance in greater proportion than the
mere increase in numbers of vessels.
Chain of command is formalized by the delegation of respon-f*
sibilities and authorities. Responsibility for getting a ;job done^
although, being delegated to some subordinate still rests with the
supreme authority. In essence, it can be said that delegation
involves a twofold responsibility: the one to whom authority is
delegated becomes responsible to the superior for doing the job
and, also, the superior still retains a responsible for getting
the job done.
In order to have true coordinat:! on it is mandatory that
exact duties, authorities and resnonsibllitles be defined by the
top official. If this Is lacking confusion and possibly friction
can only result not only at the too but also throughout the entire
command. This lack of clarity of functions with its resultant
overlapping of authority and responsibility can become intensified
by the arbitrary acquisition of line functions by the staff and a
corresponding relinquishing and disregard of responsibilities by
the line in authority. Low efficiency of operations can only be
the result.
Staff Structure
The principle of leadership becomes vitally important in
the relationship of line and staff. In every sense of the word
the leader is the head of the line and it Is this line that repre-
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sents the fighting strength of the organization. The leader must
consequently be strong not only in action but in the planning
that ^recedes that action.
The com^lexiMes of modern warfare provides too many
factors to be considered. Knowledge m^jst be too diversified for
one man to encompass. Although all decisions must remain with
the top man, it is imDerative that all oroblems come to him pre-
digested. This service is provided by the staff with all the
thought and research at their disposal.
There are two phases of this service: the informative and
the advisory. In order that the line official can successfully
perform his function, it is necessary that the service information
is objective and unbiased. The efficacy of his action is largely
dependent upon the availability to him of complete and reliable
factual information. Facts, frequently, do not speak for them-
selves. They must be interpreted and evaluated in a proper light
and in proper juxtaposition. Thus, it is also necessary for the
line official to have not only facts but also the best available
advice and counsel on ma+ters unon which he is to render a
decision. It Is arjparent that as the scope of his authority
increases so does the Importance of his staff service of informa-
tion increase proportionately.
It is evident from the foregoing that there are two impor-




Without coordination with the staff group attached to the
line, the practical result could only be confusion of counsel.
The line authority requires a complete and correlated picture for
this is necessary in making of sound decisions.
The term coordination describes the necessary method of
sound staff procedure while infiltration of knowledge is the
ultimate purpose of all staff activities. A leader is not alone
in making use of the services of a staff. Subordinates likewise
need it for the Intel lipent execution of all plans. In a military
organization where the nature of the ob.iective requires a greater
rigidity of discir)line and consequently a stronger emphasis on the
functions of command, the fact that efficient procedures cannot be
insured through contacts of command alone has been demonstrated by
military experience. To insure a completely unified structure,
unified both in form and in the spirit of common purpose, horizon-
tal coordination must likewise become a fact. This cross contact
provides a true service of knowledge.
There is one other aspect of this service of knowledge
which should be considered and it is regarded by some as the most
important of all. The leader is not alone in dispensing knowledge
to his subordinated either through staff services or directly.
The subordinates have in many cases important things to convey to
the leader, things ^hat he should know in the sound exercise of
his leadership. Likev'ise, they have imiiortant things to tell each
other, and this exchange of ideas runs through all the relations of
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superiors, subordinates and equals. The infiltration of a true
service of knowledge cannot be conceived as moving only from the
top downward. An organization can only be unified in spirit when
it has evolved a similiar course moving from bottom upward and
horizontally. All persons should have the right to be heard for
this, being a machinery for expression and a stimulus to thought,
is a means for a person to become truly informed.
Military superiority is the result of an intricate blend-
ing of three ingredients:
1. Superior operational efficiency, involving strategy, tacticjj}
and fighting ability.
2. Quality of weapons, the product of technical superiority in
desifn and manufacturing methods.
3. Logistic superiority, which delivers at the point of con-
tact a greater mass of men and material than the enemy. This has
been the greatest problem nations have had to face in all wars.
The predominant advantage possessed by the United States over the
enemy in World Vi/ar II was in the overwhelming mass of materiel
potentially available to the fighting forces. The professional
skill and courage of our fighting men at all levels was and is
beyond question but our foes likewise can be expected to yield
little ground in strategy, tactics and fighting ability. Weapon
superiority if possessed at all is short lived in competition with
an enemy who has comparable facilities. Our best and already
proven strategy is one which will provide an overwhelming quanti-
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tative superiority in materiel at all times and at the place
needed.
The continued success of this strategy is dependent upon
our continued ability to concentrate masses of material at the
point of use. Actual production in a time when intercontinental
missiles and bombers are an actual fact is, of course, a task of
great magnitude. Another and, perhaps, more difficult task is the
prober distribution of this materiel over great distances into
areas where storage and distributing facilities are limited or
must be created. All of this must be planned and coordinated and
timed to permit the full accomplishment of the mission.
This field of logistics belongs, in most of its aspects,
within the engineering world since it involves supply, distribu*
tion and installation of highly technical equipment in areas far
removed from the Continental United States. The problems inherent
in the nature of the process includes matters ast providing for
the arrival of the right item out of hundreds of thousands of
items, at the right time, in the required quantity, and at the
place of need; timing and controlling the movements of cargo
vessels by taking into consJdera-f-lon the unloading facilities,
stevedores, handling equirjment and dockage at the point of destin-
ation; devising a scheme of sutj^ly on»rations with storage and
transportation facilities located in such a Droner relation to the
point of use to give adequate support to the forces being main-
tained; planning these complex operations in relation to each

-20-
other in advance ard In great detail; exec^iting plans in an
effective manner and Tovidinp for s^jch flexibility in plans
and actions so that no strategic action will be delayed for lack
of support material.
The very nature of these complex problems dictates the
presence of personnel extensively trained and with long experience
in the fields peculiar to each problem. Presupposing that the
services have these personnel one is aware of the importance of





Coordination can be called the first principle of organ-
ization because it expresses all the principles of organization.
All subordinate principles are expressed in this one principle and
are simply a means through which coordination ODerates and becomes
effective.
True coordination of pro^iT) effort must be based on
community of interest in the attainment of established objectives.
Coordination has its foundation in authority - the supreme coor-
dinating authority. While the ultimate authority may rest with a
group as a whole or with all group members individually, certain
selected individuals as leaders, are vested by the group or fjroup
members with the exercise of that authority. A formal process
through which this coordinating authority operates from the top
throughout the entire organized body is essential for the contin-
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